 |
| All it takes is one drop of poison |
The Parsis of India and the opium trade in China.
The Parsis of India
The place of drugs and drug policies has not always received the significance such themes as race, gender, and social class have in imperial historiography. Drugs in empire have often been incorporated under the economic theme of the growth of Western capitalism in the world, as part of regional histories, or as an aspect of the rise of historical globalization. More recent scholarship, however, has placed drugs at the heart of empire. (1) Imperialism's role in drugs and drug policies has been significant as regards its commercial role in trading and trafficking drugs, its social role in fostering drug cultures around the world, its political and diplomatic roles in dominating parts of the globe through the leverage of drug policies, and its cultural role in the constructions of non-European peoples. At the same time, the historiography of drugs and imperialism has largely been confined to noting the imperialists' role in empire building through drugs and drug policies. The role of non-European colonials and groups that operated under imperialism has only recently come to be seen as an intrinsic part of the story of drugs in empire and history. (2)
Parsi traders and businessmen from Bombay and western India have played a prominent role in the history of drugs in Asia in the modern period. The historiography of drugs and empire has viewed the Parsi (and in general the Indian) involvement in China as part of Western economic expansion in Asia? The Parsi involvement in the opium trade may be regarded as a non-European contribution to the foundations of imperialism, an important component in the rise of Western capital in Asia and the development of the Indian and imperial economies. At the same time, the Parsi involvement in drugs served internal Parsi requirements and can be seen as part of the larger Parsi historical imperative to safeguard identity, and remain economically, social and politically relevant as a community at any given time. This article examines Parsi involvement in the opium trade and the ability of drugs to serve the interests of non-Europeans under imperialism. Its aim is to describe an historical process and note an episode in the history of both a community and a drug. The Parsis constitute one of the first and arguably most significant examples of the ability of drugs to positively transform the state of one of the world's smallest communities.
The Parsis are the descendants of the Zoroastrians of Iran who settled in India, by Parsi tradition, in the 8th century. The Parsis constitute one of India's smallest communities, numbering less than 80,000 individuals in India during the 19th century. Under imperialism, the Parsis would transition from an insular group to one of India's most prosperous, educated, and influential communities. From among their group emerged great merchant princes and capital elites, not least of all through the opium trade with China? The rise of the Parsis to economic preeminence corresponds with the arrival of Europeans in western India. The parameters of mutual cooperation emerged among Parsis and Europeans who both started as fledgling commercial groups? From the 18th century, Parsis functioned as hawkers and traders, interpreters, contractors, and general intermediaries for Europeans. By the 19th century, Parsis functioned as agents for British mercantile houses, guarantee brokers, and shipbuilders. (6)
Indian involvement in the opium trade
Opium is a product that was first cultivated in the Middle East and spread to India, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. It was from Java that Chinese were first introduced to opium. Mixed with tobacco, a product from the Western hemisphere that the Spanish brought to Asia, madok opium was smoked in China sometime from the mid-17th century. In 1729, an imperial edict banned the sale and consumption of this most addictive form of opium. Asiya Siddiqi notes that the ban on opium in China had a "good deal to do with the manner of European intervention." (7) The problem essentially was one of commerce and exchange, as Europeans sought valued Chinese commodities, and specifically Chinese tea, while lacking cost effective mediums of exchange. For the British East India Company (BEIC), the problem of exchange tied in with its monopoly of trade with Asia. Since 1600, the BEIC maintained a monopoly on all trade between Asia and Europe. The BEIC imported Chinese tea to England where it was consumed or sold to the wider world. The British incorporation of India into empire from 1757 provided the British with a new medium of exchange for tea in the form of Indian silver. Notwithstanding its profits from the sale of tea, the export of Bengal silver to China proved uneconomical for the BEIC's treasury. In 1773, the Bengal government assumed a monopoly on the production and sale of opium in Bengal and Indian opium became the perfect modern commodity of exchange that created its own demand and offset the costs of purchasing Chinese commodities.
The development of trade with China was an essential component to the exploitation of the commercial value of India by Europeans. Substantial Indian trade with China had begun from the last quarter of the 18th century with the export of large volumes of raw cotton. (8) Ships with large holds plied the private trade from India to China. From the beginning of the 19th century, the demand for cotton would be eclipsed by the trade in opium. By the 1820s, opium replaced cotton as the most profitable Indian export to China, and Chinese tea became the chief export item to Europe? The opium trade by Indians not only financed much of British firms" tea purchases in China but, equally importantly, it provided the British authorities with steady revenue from the duty charged on the sale of opium passing through British territory to ports in India. By the first decades of the 19th century cheaper Malwa opium from western India supplanted Patna opium from eastern India as an export item and provided for the growth of Bombay as a transshipment port for opium. Between 1821 and 1833, the export of Malwa opium from Bombay rose from less than 5,000 chests to 40,000 chests. (10)
The involvement of Indian merchants in international trade is longstanding. Andre Wink has noted the presence of colonies of Indian merchants outside the subcontinent in the Indian Ocean basin since the 9th century. (11) Claude Markovits writes that whereas the rise of the BEIC and the growth of British commercial trade from the 18th century adversely affected the share of Indian foreign trade, Indian merchants continued to carve out advantageous trading networks, specifically in the inter-Asian trade, by exploiting new markets and the security British imperial expansion afforded. (12) Prohibited from trading directly with Europe by the BEIC's monopoly, Indians were part of the private or country trade between India and China. The BEIC's interest principally lay in the trade between India and Europe, while it relied on local traders to supply consignments from East Asia, principally Chinese tea for resale in Europe. The demands of international capital co-opted private merchants, both Indian and European, as prime players in the opium trade. Indian opium was imported at Canton and was sold to Chinese smugglers in exchange for silver, which in turn was transferred to the BEIC coffers as well as used to purchase export goods. The total proceeds of the trade included specie, Chinese commodities of which tea became the principal item, and bills of exchange.
The issuing of bills of exchange to Indian and other traders was a financial device employed by the BEIC to provide its treasury in Canton with funds without expending the resources of the Company in direct trade between India and China. Private traders deposited the proceeds of their sales in the Company's treasury in Canton and received international bills of exchange assigned on Company or Indian government revenue. (13) The requisites of international commerce and imperialism coincided. A triangular trade emerged in Asia whereby India paid tribute to Britain in the sum of four million pounds per annum at the beginning of the 19th century, of which three million consisted of tribute and the remainder transfers of other wealth and commercial earnings. British debt to China for commodities was discharged through the import of Indian opium, which in turn, as an export also functioned to pay for India's debt to Britain. In The intricacies of the exchange mechanism reveals opium's crucial role in the development of international finance and exchange and modern globalization.
A diverse body of Indian merchants was involved in the early China and opium trades, including Armenians, Indian Jews, and Parsis. These groups formed minority communities in India that exploited novel business opportunities such as international commerce, in competition with more established castes and communities in India that often dominated existing markets and commercial spheres. The opium trade along with commercial cooperation with Europeans offered opportunities for not only commercial profit but also for the enhancement of moral community and the rise of Indian individuals, groups and communities to prominence. (15)
Zoroastrianism has been noted to have entered China from the 6th century via the Silk Road, and Zoroastrian fire temples existed in northern China. (16) However, no evidence exists that the Parsi traders who went to China from the 18th century had knowledge or contact with the inland Zoroastrian communities. The Parsis grew dominant in trade among the Indians in China, conducting the China trade from the principal Indian ports of Bombay, Daman, Calcutta, and Karachi. From the early 18th century Bombay had became the headquarters of the Parsi community, as Parsis migrated to the city from the provincial setting and took advantage of the security the British presence offered and the opportunity to develop a new center of commercial activity relatively free from the intense competition of more established Indian cities such as Surat. By the late 18th century Bombay emerged as a major entrepot on the west coast of India and a hub of Parsi trade with China.
The opium trade would see the first modern Parsi diaspora outside India take shape in East Asia. Parsis in China were recognizable by their appearance, dress and customs, and were known as white heads for the wearing of white head gear. (17) Between 1828 and 1848, the Chinese Repository of foreigners in China lists 40 to 45 Parsi residents of Canton. (18) In the 1830s, Parsi communities appeared in Canton, Amoy, and Shanghai, and the first Parsi burial ground outside India appeared in Macao in 1829 at Estrada Dos Parses or Parsi Road. (19) In 1845, an anjuman or Zoroastrian community association was founded at Canton with the purposes of establishing burial grounds, arranging community meetings, and providing assistance to community members in the China centers. In 1845, 1847, and 1854 Parsi cemeteries were established in Hong Kong, Whampoa, and Shanghai. (20)
The Parsis were part of the emergence of a new world trading pattern that linked Asia and Europe together. They were also one of the first significant new Asian trading entities to emerge in the period of imperialism. Western capital found assistance in the requirements of Asian entrepreneurs. Parsi commerce with China included the trade in cotton, timber, textiles, silk, and opium. Parsi activity in the opium trade included collecting Malwa opium from the interior of western India, and transshipping it from Indian ports. Through individual perseverance, the pooling of resources among Parsis and other Indians, and in partnering with British traders, the early Parsi merchants amassed the finances for trade. Parsis procured goods for export as brokers for European agency houses or trading firms. Many Parsis became business partners with the notable firms of Magniac & Co., Jardine Matheson & Co., Forbes & Co., Remington & Co., and Russell & Co. Parsis also owned their own opium and other export stocks and consigned them to agency houses for sale. By 1837. eleven Parsi companies operated in Canton, compared with only nine American and four European firms. (21) The Parsis' willingness to engage in the country trade furthermore set them apart from other Indians. Parsis operated their own shipping fleets. The Wadias, Banajis, Rustomjis, and Jejeebhoys owned over 50 vessels involved in the China trade in the first half of the 19th century, which constituted a third of the ships in the trade. (22)
The China trade was essential in transforming Parsis from minor hawkers and traders to the status of merchant princes and the founders of great Parsi families. Hirji Jivanji and his brother Maneckji are acknowledged to be the first Parsis to go to China in 1756 and establish a firm in Canton, which was the only port open to foreigners at the time. The Jivanjis owned seven ships, half of which were for the China trade. (23) The Jivanji's China trade proved so profitable that the family took the surname of Readymoney, and like other Parsis translated commercial wealth into charitable largesse to the Parsi and broader Indian communities. (24) Pestonjee Cowasjee Sethna established Cowasjee Pallanjee & Co. in 1794, one of the first Parsi firms in Canton, and he died in Macao in 1842. (25) The Patels of Bombay were in charge of the dockyard and local trade of the city. Dorabjee Rustomjee Patel established trade ties with Burma and Malaya and made three trips to China from Bombay up to 1804. (26) The Banajis had early on established contacts with China and Burma through their trade in timber, silk, and opium. Banaji Limji went to Bombay from Bhagvadandi, near Surat in 1690. An employee of the BEIC for a time, he amassed enough financial resources to resign his commission and develop his own trade with East Asia. (27) Framji Cowasji Banaji became the most renowned member of his family, establishing trade ties with China and diversifying his business into agriculture and other industries. As a testament to Indian industry, in 1838 Framji Cowasji sent Queen Victoria a case of well-preserved mangoes in celebration of her coronation. (28) The nephews of Framji Cowasji established the firm of D & M Rustomjee in Canton. (29)
In 1730 Lowjee Wadia went to Bombay from Surat by invitation of the British to establish a drydock. The Wadia family of master shipbuilders provided many a vessel for the China trade and would become one of the Parsi community's greatest families. (30) Similarly, the Bharda family, whose descendants are known as Damanwalla, conducted the early opium trade to Africa and China from the West coast port of Daman, which was also a center of opium smuggling. (31) The Camas would build the basis of their wealth beginning with the China trade. Camaji Kuvarji went to Bombay in 1735, and soon after his sons Mancherji and Edalji began the trade to East Asia. (32) The Tata family established trade with China much later than other Parsis. In 1859, Nusserwanji Tata began the firm of Jamsetji & Ardeshir in Hong Kong with the Jains Kaliandas and Premchand Roychund importing opium and exporting tea and other commodities. After some business vicissitudes, by 1883 the firm of Tata Sons & Co. emerged with branches in Hong Kong and Shanghai. (33) The China trade provided the financial foundations for many of the major Parsi business concerns of the 19th century, and opium constituted an important portion of the overall China trade. The China trade furthermore established the Parsi entrepreneurs as leaders of the Parsi community. Their wealth, socioeconomic and political connections to Europeans, and example commended them as Parsi community leaders. The Dadyseth family traded with China and its members were recognized as the heads of the Parsi community of Bombay from the late 18th century. (34)
Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy
The foremost Parsi China merchant was Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy (1783-1859). Jejeebhoy's business life and other affairs are largely gleaned from an extensive set of unpublished letters he left that offer an intriguing picture of the first half of the 19th century. The written record of activity is unusual for an Indian businessman to have kept, but reflected Jejeebhoy's transition from merchant to international businessman, influential citizen, and celebrity that he sought to privately detail. Jejeebhoy became wealthy largely through the trade in opium, and his early business life gives insight into the nature of the early Indian China and opium trades. R. B. Madon writes that Jejeebhoy began as a merchant with Rs. 120 and collected and sold empty bottles, which earned him the surname of Batliwala or Bottlewaller. (35) Like many early Indian merchants, Jejeebhoy first entered into business with relatives. Jejeebhoy joined his uncle F. N. Battliwala and his cousin M. M. Tabak in trade, and on the latter's behalf undertook his first trip to China in 1800. Jejeebhoy made four other trips to China up to 1807, at the end of which period he was a full partner with his uncle. The success of his early trade afforded Jejeebhoy the opportunity to start his own merchant shipping fleet, which established the foundations of his consignment business. In 1814 he purchased his first ship Good Success, followed by six more ships and chartered others as the volume of trade increased. In 1818 Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy & Co. was formed, and in 1836 was subsequently renamed Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Sons & Co. Jejeebhoy took as his partners the Jain Motichund Amichund and the Konkani Muslim Mahomed Ali Rogay. Some time after, they were joined by the Catholic Goan Rogeria de Faria who became a partner. (36) It was a diverse group that did not differentiate along religious or social lines, and remained as much friends as business associates. This consortium established a major trading network and secured financing and partnerships worthy of largescale commerce. Jejeebhoy and his Indian partners established a supply network which saw a virtual monopoly of the Malwa opium crop shipped from Bombay by the 1830s. (37) Jejeebhoy's firm handled his own consignment trade as well as goods on behalf of other Indians. The China trade put Jejeejbhoy in contact with the major trading entities in China including the European agency houses of Remington & Co., Forbes & Co., Magniac & Co., Jardine Matheson & Co., the American firm of Russell & Co., and the Chinese merchant Howqua or Wu Tun Yuan. (38) Jejeebhoy's relationship with Jardine Matheson & Co. took place from the 1820s, and Alain Le Pichon writes that it dwarfed all the others business ties the British company had. The latter firm transacted more than $2 million of Jejeebhoy's business annually. (39)
The opium regimes
Jejeebhoy, other Parsis, Indians, Europeans, and Chinese traders, brokers, and officials all formed part of what has been referred to as the opium regimes; the collection of governmental, private business, and individual interests that transcended national boundaries. The opium regimes have largely been seen as serving the interests of drug proliferation and imperial domination. At the same time, the opium regimes evince the complexity of the opium trade in Asia, to which Asians and Europeans were parties that both benefited. (40) The opium regimes emerged from the triangular trade in commodities between Europe, India, and China that connected Europe and Asia together not only commercially but also politically and socioculturally. The first half of the 19th century saw the birth of the modern world system in which the economic, political and cultural dominance of the West emerged, supported through the cooperation of global economic interests in Europe and Asia. British-Indian commercial cooperation produced not only a highly profitable economic relationship, but also sociopolitical linkages. In the first half of the 19th century, the major European, Parsi and Indian opium traders constituted an informal but tight oligopoly. The age of partnership saw close patron-client relationships develop among Indian and European businessmen, which would be in sharp contrast to the more racially segregated business culture of the age of high imperialism. Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy and William Jardine were personal friends from 1805. Business partners in this commercial culture referred to each other as friends and rival business houses as neighbors, and merchants freighted shipments of goods on each other's ships, agency houses waived commissions on consignments between parties, and offered other assistance for the conclusion of each other's transactions. (41)
The morality of good business ethics and the profitable conclusion of trade informed the values of this culture. British, European, American, Indian, and Chinese opium suppliers, traders and handlers adhered to the market imperative and prevailing economic philosophy that conceived of China as a source of demand and India as a source of supply. The Parsi traders treated the opium trade as a lucrative enterprise alongside the trade in other commodities. Moral reservations associated with the trade in opium, addiction, and with cultural and political questions concerning the penetration of imperialism in Asia only entered the traders' calculations inasmuch as it affected their trade, if at all. Jejeebhoy's chief preoccupation was the efficient conduct of his commerce, and in particular the welfare of his goods and the prompt remittance of his payment. (42) By the middle of the 19th century Jejeebhoy's commercial empire had come to an end, while he was publicly acknowledged as one of Bombay and India's great philanthropists and developed a broad vision of Indian welfare that challenged imperialism to be receptive to Indian requirements. (43) However, no evidence suggests that worries about the health of his soul and the need to ease one's conscience as a result of his business activities entered Jejeebhoy's calculations. An interesting contemporary portrait emerges of the use of a powerful narcotic substance whose nature affords a great commercial demand in the form of addiction, yet is treated by the participants in trade as a commodity like almost any other. Such a portrait accounts for the dichotomy in the historiography of opium in empire, as being seen as both a moral and economic crime and as a moral trade. (44)
The ambiguities of the opium trade
The role of Parsis and other Indians in the opium trade highlights both the ambiguities and the agency of colonials involved in the opium trade under imperialism. As regards the trade in India, Farooqui notes that some of the Bombay traders were rarely able to fathom the intricacies of the Malwa market. Internally the Malwa trade remained a closeknit affair, where the wholesalers protected their profits. The Bombay exporters had to content themselves with the profits that they could make after the drug was purchased from the suppliers of the interior. The export of opium also held many difficulties for the Indian traders. Whereas even the big traders, like Jejeebhoy, circumvented many difficulties by having a hand in the internal trade and owning their own ships, they still had to rely on the agency houses to which the opium was consigned to realize profits from sales in China. (45)
Parsis and other Indian merchants often bore the principal risks associated with the China trade outside India. Economically and politically it benefited the BEIC and the European agency houses to have Indians operate the opium trade. Indian merchants and shipowners bore the disadvantages of the costs of ships and consignments, delays in credit remittance, and commodity price fluctuations. (46) Beginning in 1814, the Parsi Muncherji Jamsetji Wadia twice entered into partnerships with Europeans who subsequently absconded with the ships and cargo bound for China at a cost to Wadia of over Rs. 40,000. (47) Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy's rags to riches life story also contains colorful adventures relating to the trade with China, and highlighting the difficulties. On his second voyage to China, he was almost overtaken by a great storm, and on the return voyage the ship he was sailing on was unsuccessfully attacked by a French vessel. On his fourth voyage in July 1805, while returning to Bombay from Canton on the British man-of-war Brunswick, two French frigates captured the vessel and escorted it to the Cape of Good Hope. Jejeebhoy's goods were confiscated and after five months he secured voyage to Calcutta on a Danish vessel for himself and others at a cost of Rs. 1600. Jejeebhoy's fourth trip was also significant, as he would meet James Matheson while held captive by the French; an encounter that would change both men's lives and influence the course of history. (48)
One issue that preoccupied Indian businessmen was the issue of compensation for their trade. The financial mechanisms devised in the form of issuing bills of exchange to pay Indian opium traders was of considerable benefit to the BEIC and European agency houses, though it often disadvantaged Indians. The early opium trade involved an illegal, initially expensive, and transglobal commodity that was difficult to integrate into the beginnings of modern international finance and exchange. Indian merchants had considerable difficulties in transferring earnings from opium sold in China back to India. The situation was compounded when the BEIC's monopoly ended in 1833 and other parties began to dominate the trade. American bills of exchange redeemable in London and other Western capitals became a desirable medium of exchange for commodities among Europeans. This form of repayment, however, disadvantaged Indian merchants who encountered difficulties in selling such bills in Bombay or had to endure long waits for the repatriation of funds sent to London. (49)
Long delays in credit remittance plagued Indian merchants, who complained bitterly. Jejeebhoy's business correspondence is replete with complaints to some European agency houses of the tardy remittance of not only the payment for his consignment but also those of his friends on whose behalf he traded. One such letter notes:
We much regret that we have such repeated cause to complain of your management of our little business under your charge .... You must be aware that we have our general agents who do our business, and give us the most entire satisfaction, and therefore unless we can be assured of the same from you there will be no inducement to avail your services .... We hope in future you will give more attention to our business and also to that of our native friends on whose account we are as anxious as our own. (50)
The tone of the correspondence reflects Parsi fortitude in defense of their commercial dealings. Whereas Indian merchants facilitated imperial commerce and exchange through the transshipment of Indian commodities and the development of new financial mechanisms, international commerce did not always easily redound to their benefit.
Indian agency
The Parsis, however, were resourceful and exercised considerable agency in benefit of their situation. The Parsis circumvented the pre-Opium War Canton System, which the restrictions imposed on foreign traders in China since the 18th century came to be known. Parsis and foreign traders had evaded the ban on the importation of opium first enacted by the Chinese government in 1796. They had established factories or warehouses in Canton and at Macao, often staying on in China well past the season granted foreign merchants. Parsis also utilized their economic clout to leverage the select official Chinese merchants, known as co-hongs, which the Canton System had restricted foreign merchants to deal only with. The Parsis were major creditors and moneylenders to Chinese co-hongs. Parsis offered loans and extended credit to co-hong merchants for the purchase of goods, who subsequently were often disadvantaged in the fluctuation of prices of the commodities trade. Some Parsis at times proved particularly hard nosed in their dealings with Chinese, extending substantial amounts of credit and letting debts accumulate, only to demand payment or concessions from officials. (51)
Parsi actions to some degree anticipated the economic provisions of the treaty system imposed on China following the Opium War. Once again, Parsi actions corresponded to the business ethics and culture of the time. Whereas business partnerships produced favorable sociopolitical linkages and ties, economic competition solicited more mercenary reactions. That Parsi business ethics were clearly not incompatible with the culture of the time is evident in the contemporary British literature that characterizes the Parsi reputation as honest and truthful, and as reliable partners. In 1804, George Viscount Valentia commented that the Parsis "are a very rich, active and loyal body of men .... I confess that I infinitely prefer them to any race of people in the East subject to British control." (52) Some years later in 1808, the British official at Bombay Sir James Mackintosh commented of British-Parsi relations: "I consider [Parsi] prosperity with some national pride. I view their wealth as a monument of our justice." (53)
The Parsis, along with private merchants and the agency houses, also agitated economically and politically for an end to the Canton System. Delphine Menant notes that Parsis signed a petition to the British government dated December 21, 1830, urging action to stop Chinese interference in the opium trade. (54) On August 10, 1834, 24 Parsis signed a similar letter to William John Napier, the Chief Superintendent of Trade at Canton, and the Parsi Dadabhai Rustamji Banaji became a member of the new Chamber of Commerce committee established to represent the traders at Canton. (55) Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy noted his support for greater British pressure on the Chinese and ultimately for British war aims in China during the first Opium War of 1839 to 1842. At the same time, Jejeebhoy appreciated the value of the threat of force to its use on the Chinese: "[The threatened arrival of] reinforcements would move Peking as no other step appears likely to awaken the Emperor to his dangers or induce him to meet our demands for redress for the past and the safety of the future." (56)
The ambiguities and agency of the Parsis were clearly evident in the period prior to and following the Opium War, and both ultimately underscored their subservient place within the imperial economic and sociopolitical order. The petitions and letters in support of British diplomatic pressure on the Chinese highlight Parsi-British economic and sociopolitical ties. At the same time, Parsis and other Indian traders always remained at the mercy of British military and diplomatic protection. In 1839. conditions in China deteriorated for the foreign traders as the Chinese official Commissioner Lin Zexu forced traders to surrender their opium stashes. One thousand cases of opium belonging to Dadabhai and Maneckji Rustamji Banaji and 1,324 cases belonging to Heerjeebhoy Rustomjee were among the Parsi opium batches burned by the Chinese; four Parsis were also temporarily detained by Chinese authorities. (57)
Whereas Indian traders would benefit from the treaty concessions wrought by the British from the Chinese following the Opium Wars, many Parsis and Indians were never adequately compensated by the British government for their losses during the conflicts, and some Parsi traders committed suicide due to the delay in compensation after the first Opium War. (58) Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy noted the anguish of Indians over the compensation for losses during the Opium War:
Several very respectable natives have lately become insolvent consequent upon the non-payment of their opium claims; they have held out in the hope of receiving some part at least but now finding nothing forthcoming have been obliged to give in; their credit and the forbearance of their creditors being both exhausted. I certainly expected that some part of the ransom money would have been given to us who have suffered so much but nothing is done for us nor such a hope held out of our fair and just claims being made good. (59)
The penumbra of benefits
Notwithstanding the various difficulties Parsis experienced from the China trade and Opium Wars, the advantages of the opium trade for Parsis were multiple. The first benefit included the sheer financial profit of the opium trade, which was so lucrative to some Parsi firms, such as P & D. N. Cama Co., that rewards were paid to the Bombay police for the recovery of stolen opium stashes. (60) For much of the 19th century, the trade in opium was freely conducted from India, and the figures of opium sales and the profits of government were regularly quoted in the major newspapers. The revenue from the sales of opium for the year 1857, were quoted to have exceeded "the most sanguine expectations of government," with the net proceeds totaling Rs. 3,51,54,460, up from the figure of Rs. 2,71,37,210 for 1856. (61)
The political benefit of commercial collaboration and the opium trade was also significant for Indians. During the 19th century, the Parsis of India along with other segments of Indian society accepted the British as the supreme authority in India, and welcomed the stability, security and rewards of British rule. Unlike other communities, groups and interests in India that either forcefully resisted British rule or withdrew from the public arena into their community-centered activities, as were the effective options for Indians under imperialism, Parsis sensed the advantages of sociopolitical cooperation or collaboration with the British for individual and collective rewards. Inevitably, many Indians became vital supports of the imperial order stabilizing British rule in India. The Parsis in particular would assume loyalty, as one of the many markers the British promoted in identifying colonials with British rule. (62)
As early as the later 18th century, the British recognized the Parsi and Indian businessmen as both leaders of their respective castes and communities, and the representatives of their communities to the British in Bombay. (63) Government imprimatur transformed the descendants of hawkers and traders into shetias or great urban notables, and leaders of local community and society, to some degree displacing more traditional religious leaders within the urban Indian community. Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy became a member of the Parsi Panchayat or internal government of the Parsis in 1823, and was considered the representative of the general Indian community of Bombay to the British from the 1830s. (64) The first half of the 19th century witnessed the rise of the shetias to great influence in the urban scene of India where they performed the dual function as leaders of caste communities and civic society. In the late 1820s Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, Framji Cowasji Banaji, and the Hindu Jagannath Shankarshet successfully petitioned the British for the right of the shetias of Bombay to sit as grand jurors in Supreme Court cases. In 1834, 13 shetias of Bombay, including four Parsis, were named justices of the peace, thus involving them in the administration of the city. (65)
In many Indian urban centers the first half of the 19th century was marked by the influence of the shetias on the civic scene. The wealth of the China and opium trades, as well as the industrial era, which the opium trade inspired and financed, furthermore provided for the expansion and consolidation of the moral and material supports of the Parsis, as well as the improvement of Bombay civic society. The enormous profits of the China and opium trades would be funneled by many shetias into great public charity and projects. Shetia charity served the multiple purposes of improving the civic environment, enhancing shetia sociopolitical ties to imperialism, and shaping new public images of the old opium dealers and their descendants as civic philanthropists. The charity of the shetias was modeled in deference to British cultural values and imperatives including public projects and medical and educational causes, along the lines associated with Western humanitarian service. (66) The Parsis' economic wealth and cultural affinity to the British particularly advantaged them in exploiting avenues for sociopolitical advancement within this new political culture of charity. During the 19th century, Parsi charity extended itself in support to various concerns within and without the Parsi community of India. Between 1820 and 1910, the greater part of the religious endowments of the Parsi community were built and/or consecrated, including at least one fire temple, Tower of Silence or burial ground, every year somewhere in India. From the 1830s to the 1930s, the greater part of the modern Parsi social infrastructure also took shape, as over 400 schools, libraries, hospitals and medical facilities were built and/or funded, principally for Parsis. In addition over 200 additional charitable projects and funds were established in support of various non-Parsi causes inside and outside India. The phrase "Parsi thy name is charity" became ubiquitous in India. (67)
Furthermore, Parsi charity provided example for the broader community. By the mid-19th century, Indian public charity assumed epic proportions as Indian urban centers competed over which had the better educational, medical, and civic environment. Shetias also competed in their conspicuous charity. The Parsi Cowasjee Jehangir Readymoney contributed Rs. 1,00,000 to the erection of new buildings for the University of Bombay, only to be matched and raised in his contribution by the Jain Premchand Roychund, who offered Rs. 2,00,000. (68) Significantly, Indian charity and public spiritedness compelled the British to acknowledge their initiatives and take greater interest in civic projects. (69) By mid-century, the authority of the shetias was challenged by a new generation of educated Indians desirous for urban leadership; albeit the charity of the shetias remained the noticeable expression of their relevance in Indian society.
Opium provided for the enhancement of reputations and the lore of celebrity, even if its role was conveniently downplayed. The conspicuous wealth and charity of the Parsi philanthropists continued to capture the public imagination. Again, the case of Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy is noteworthy. Jejeebhoy's commercial empire had effectively ended by 1855, yet his reputation continued to grow as he became an exemplary Indian philanthropist. Jejeebhoy was declared to be Bombay's prince of charity and hospitality. (70) In 1855 the value of his charitable contributions totaled 234,000 [pounds sterling], and by his death in 1859 totaled Rs. 24,59,736 or some 245,000 [pounds sterling]. Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy's most important charitable contributions included the Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Hospital built in 1842 at a cost of 21,000 [pounds sterling] to Jejeebhoy, and the Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Parsi Benevolent Institution built in 1849 at a cost of 44,000 [pounds sterling] to Jejeebhoy, which established the first Indian-run educational system in Bombay and western India. (71) In 1842 in recognition by the British of his many acts of charity, the one-time opium merchant became the first Indian knight and in 1857 the first Indian baronet. The number of other Indians that received hereditary and honorary titles from the British was a measure of the political significance that the leadership of the philanthropists assumed under imperialism. Eight Indians in the Bombay Presidency obtained hereditary baronetcies during British rule, including three Parsis: Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy (1857), Sir Dinshaw Manakji Petit (1890), and Sir Cowasjee Jehangir II (1908). By 1946, 63 Parsis were knighted. (72)
The rise of Hong Kong
The trade in opium also provided for the expansion of Parsi and Indian business in East Asia. The post-Opium War economic and political disposition saw a general expansion of foreign trade in China. Indian business exploited the opening of treaty ports in China, including the rise of Hong Kong. While for many decades following the First Opium War Hong Kong remained a center for the opium trade, post-mid-19th century Hong Kong emerged as an independent center of legitimate business activity. As Philip Curtin has observed of the history of overseas commerce, new "trade diasporas" emerge whereby minority trading groups utilize their commercial expertise, community connections, and other advantages to dominate commerce in a host society. (73) Colin Crisswell notes that at mid-century there were about 200 foreign firms in Hong Kong and the treaty ports, of which half were British and a quarter Indian or Parsi. (74) Hong Kong became a center of Indian activity in a variety of fields including international trade, retail trade, finance and brokerage, and real estate. (75)
Among the Indian businessmen, many Parsis shaped the life of Hong Kong. As early as 1841, the potentialities of real estate and the growth of Hong Kong were not lost on the Parsi Dadabhoy Rustamjee, known as Daddy Boy to his fellow businessmen, who purchased Marine Lot 5 in the first auction of land in Hong Kong. The property was a prime site on Queen's Road at the waterfront and was later to be converted to the site for the Hong Kong Hotel, the colony's first major hotel. (76) Dorabji Naoroji went to Hong Kong in 1852 and soon owned a bakery, warehouses, and the Victoria, King Edward and Kowloon Hotels. He is credited with establishing the Kowloon Ferry Company, the first ferry service between Hong Kong Island and Kowloon, which was bought out by the Star Company in 1898. (77) The Tatas are testament to development of Hong Kong as a center of Indian business activity. Nusserwanji Tata and his sons were involved in the opium trade in East Asia from the late 1850s. From the 1880s, the firm of Tata & Co. later to be Tata Sons & Co. would conduct an export trade of manufactured goods between India and China and establish the Tata Lines shipping company in collaboration with Japan's Nippon Yusen Kalsha, which offered low rate freight shipping and survived to 1895. (78)
Some prominent Parsis also gained great public profile for their civic spiritedness and philanthropy in Hong Kong akin to their Parsi counterparts in Bombay. H.N. Mody arrived in Hong Kong in 1858 to trade in opium and would become one of Hong Kong's great Indian taipans or merchant princes establishing a business empire in real estate and banking. Mody contributed to the erection of many of the early buildings of the University of Hong Kong, which was inaugurated in 1910, a year before his death. Mody's conspicuous charity was a measure of his confidence in the long-term development of Hong Kong, and inspired others to contribute to the civic improvement of the city, earning him a knighthood for his charity. (79)
The diversification of business
Opium was fundamental in the birth of the modern Indian economy, and the Parsis played a significant role in its development. By the mid-19th century, most Parsi entrepreneurs diversified their business ventures away from opium, and pioneered new industries. The great Parsi merchant-princes gave way to the rise of the great Parsi capital elites. Parsi enterprise in the middle of the 19th century built on the expertise and resources of previous generations. The Parsi pioneers of the that century, consequently, were often the descendants of early China traders. The capital formations of the opium trade helped finance the rise of joint-stock banking and the insurance industry in Bombay, the development of new trading patterns, and the industrialization of India. In 1836, the Bombay Chamber of Commerce was formed with 10 of the original 25 members being Parsi, and included members of the Wadia, Dadiseth, Banaji, and Readymoney families. (80)
The cotton industry centered in Bombay was one of the first large-scale enterprises to emerge as a result of the rise of banking and changing trade patterns. For over half a century, Parsis would dominate and pioneer advances in the cotton industry in India. The Parsi Cowasji Nanabhoy Davar is credited with opening the first steam powered press and cotton textile mill in India in 1854, at Tardeo in Bombay. Davar was the son of a Parsi China merchant, was broker for two British firms, and operated his own firm that traded with China. Davar promoted four Bombay banks between 1846 and 1863, and participated in the formation of the Bombay Steam Navigation Company. (81) In 1855, Manakji Nasarvanji Petit began the Oriental Spinning and Weaving Company, the second mill established in Bombay, in cooperation with four partners. M.N. Petit was a broker and China trader who soon followed the opening of the Oriental Mill with that of the Petit Mills, in partnership with the Parsi Merwanji Framji Panday. (82) Manakji's son Dinshaw Manakji Petit floated his first cotton mill in 1860, and followed it with four more by the end of the decade. By 1875, D.M. Petit was recognized as one of India's wealthiest men and richest Parsis. (83) The spin-off effects of early industry were also evident as new technological innovations facilitated the rise of the Indian industrial sector. In 1879, Nowrozjee Nusserwanjee Wadia, who managed Petit Mills for D.M. Petit, founded the first of his mills, the Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., pioneering the process of dyeing yarn and cloth in India. (84) The strength of the mill industry was only seriously challenged by the Parsi J.N. Tata. Jamsetjee Nusserwanjee Tata was of a religious background from Navsari and the son of Nusserwanjee Tara. J.N. Tata would open mills, a polytechnic university, and lay the foundations for diversifying Indian industry into steel production. The Tata brand would become one of India and world's greatest business conglomerates. (85)
Decline of the opium trade
The opium trade continued in China arguably till the resolution of the civil war in 1949. By the second half of the 19th century, however, the pattern of Indian involvement in the trade had changed considerably. Economic factors largely explain the decline of the opium trade from India. The introduction of newer and faster American clipper ships, the arrival of new traders and shippers that included Indians such as, Ismailis, Marwaris, and Sindhis and, in East Asia, Japanese and Koreans changed the nature of the old China and opium trades. Both the American clipper ships and the new Indian traders bypassed the use of the old transshippers, and shipped and managed opium stashes on their own account. The plantation of opium in China further saw a decline in the Patna and Malwa opium to China. (86)
Moral factors also began to finally affect the opium trade from India. A growing opprobrium against the trade in the British Empire made opium dealing no longer a matter of simple economics, as moral arguments long evident but long suppressed in the interests of trade now made opium trading morally indefensible. In a letter dated October 7, 1844, the British official Sir Charles Forbes wrote to the Parsi opium trader Bomanjee Hormarjee Wadia: "I know not whether you have now anything to do with opium, but I would repeat to you the advice I have often given to your worthy father before you--abstain from this cursed traffic" [original italics]. (87) In 1844, the moral argument for free trade, as in the interests of all tree parties, prevailed over other moral arguments against opium trading. By the 20th century, the effects of opium addiction were long evident and moral arguments increasingly affected perceptions of trade. As with the end of the slave trade and slavery, Europeans" sense of moral superiority led to the moral argument against opium dealing, which incidentally involved an appreciation of Asians" addiction and plight. Ultimately, European self-perceptions would affect other Asians to end their trade in opium. In 1895, the British government declared its intention to control the trade in future without specifying a date. In 1906. Chinese officials also announced their intention to close the trade in 10 years. (88) By 1913 the trade in opium from India effectively came to an end with the declaration by both the Indian and Bombay governments to permanently suspend the export of opium from India to China. By the end of the year operations at the Bombay opium warehouses and dockyards ended. (89)
From the mid- 19th century, the majority of Parsi opium merchants had begun to leave the opium trade and, as noted earlier, substantially diversified their business interests away from opium. The adaptable Parsis had gauged the prevailing economic and sociopolitical atmosphere surrounding opium and began to pioneer new business ventures. Parsi involvement in the opium trade stands as an important episode in the history of the Parsis of India and the history of opium. The China trade and opium as part of that trade was essential in the commercial and sociopolitical rise of individual Parsis and the Parsi community to prominence. The wealth from the trade provided the material foundation for the diversification of Parsi business that in turn provided for the rise of many of the moral and charitable foundations of the Parsis and larger Indian civic culture. Furthermore, the trade brought Parsi entrepreneurs into social and political contact with British and other Europeans facilitating the Parsis' advantageous place within imperialism. At the same time, the Parsi involvement in the opium trade was one aspect of the larger history of the Zoroastrians of India. It would be largely forgotten and omitted from the collective memory of the Parsis of India, as a history of economic, social, educational, professional and cultural accomplishments came to rightly define the history of the modern Parsis, and became markers of identity of the very small community. Albeit, the impact of opium world wide was multiple and not least of all in substantially shaping the history of one of the world's smallest communities.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: The article follows the general orthography and spelling of Indian words in modern English. hence Parsi as opposed to Parsee. The phonetic nature of Parsi and Indian names lends to innumerable ways for their spelling, including among contemporaries. Parsi and Indian proper n) antes have not been standardized and appear as they were written in contemporary documents, and as represented on documents bearing signatures of the individuals indicated.
Indian currency in rupees appears according to Indian decimalization and usage of the time.
Notes
(1.) Carl A. Trocki, Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade, 1750-1950 (New York: Routledge, 1999): Tim Brook & Bob Wakabayashi (eds.), Opium Regimes. China. Britain and Japan, 1839-1952 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000): W. Jankowiak & D. Bradburd (eds.), Drugs, Labour and Colonial Expansion (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003); Frank Ditotter, Lars Laamann & Xun Zhou. Narcotic Culture: A History, of Drugs in China (London: Hurst London, 2004): Roy Moxham, Tea: Addiction, Exploitation and Empire (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers. 2003).
(2.) See the collection of essays, James H. Mills & Patricia Barton (eds.), Drugs and Empires: Essays in Modern Imperialism and Intoxication. c. 1500-c. 1930 (Houndmills. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 2007).
(3.) Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800-42 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951); John K. Fairbank. Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports. 1842-1854 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1964).
(4.) See D.F. Karaka, History, of the Parsis, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1884): Eckehard Kulke, The Parsis of India: A Minority as Agents of Social Change (Munich: Verlag, 1974); Jesse S. Palsetia, The Parsis of India: Preservation of Identity in Bombay City (Leiden: Brill, 2001).
(5.) Tapan Raychaudhuri, The Eighteenth Century Background, in The Cambridge Economic History of India. vol. 2: c. 1700-1970, edited by Dharma Kumar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 3-35: Ashin Das Gupta, Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat, 1700-1750 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1979); K.N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Holden Furber, Bombay Presidency in the Mid-Eighteenth Century (London: Asia Publishing House, 1965); Pamela Nightingale. Trade and Empire in Western India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970): David L. White. Parsis in the Commercial World of Western India, 1700-1750, The Indian Economic and Social History, Review, 24. no. 2 (1987), pp. 183-203; Amalendu Guha, The Comprador Role of Parsi Seths, 1750-1850, Economic and Political Weekly, 5, no. 48 (November, 1970). pp. 1933-1938.
(6.) Karaka, vol. 2. pp. 9-11, 18, 38-40, 53.55.56, 60-65, 70-71, 75, 77, 253-59. 262: Dinsha E. Wacha. Shells from the Sands of Bombay: Being My Recollections and Reminiscences, 1860-75 (Bombay: K.T. Anklesaria. 1920), pp. 98, 211-212. 279-280, 626-627: M.M. Murzban. The Parsis: Being an Enlarged and Copiously Annotated. Up to Date English Edition of Mlle. Delphine Menant's Les Parsis. 2 vols. (Bombay, 1917, reprint, 1994), vol. 1, p. 69; R.E. Enthoven (ed.), The Tribes and Castes of Bombay, vol. 3 (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1922) p. 461; Delphine Menant, The Parsis, vol. 3, translated by Anthony D. Mango (Bombay: Danai, 1996), pp. 241-242.
(7.) Asiya Siddiqi, Pathways of the Poppy, in India and China in the Colonial World, edited by Madhavi Thampi (New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2005), p. 23.
(8.) Greenberg, pp. 79-82, 88-91.
(9.) Greenberg, pp. 81, 106.
(10.) Greenberg, p. 221.
(11.) Andre Wink, Al Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World, vol. 1, Early Medieval India and the Expansion of Islam 7-11th Centuries (Leiden: Brill, 1990).
(12.) Claude Markovits, The Global World of Indian Merchants, 1750-1947: Traders of Sind from Bukhara to Panama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), ch. 1.
(13.) Ashok V. Desai, The Origins of Parsi Enterprise, The Indian Economic and Social History Review 5 (1968), p. 310; Greenberg, pp. 11-12.
(14.) Siddiqi 2005, p. 28.
(15.) See Christine E. Dobbin Urban Leadership in Western India: Politics and Communities in Western India, 1840-1885 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972); Palsetia 2001, ch. 1.
(16.) Frantz Grenet, Religious Diversity Among Sogdian Merchants in Sixth-Century China: Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Manichaeism, and Hinduism, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, vol. 27, no. 2 (2007), pp. 463-478; Jiang Boqin, An Iconological Study of the Decorative Elements on the Zoroastrian Temple in Jiexiu, Shanxi, China Archaeology and Art Digest, no. 13: Zoroastrianism in China (December 2000), pp. 85-101. See also other articles on Zoroastrianism in China in same journal.
(17.) Menant, p. 348.
(18.) See Amalendu Guha, Parsi Seths as Entrepreneurs. 1750-1850, Economic and Political Weekly 5, no. 3 (1969), pp. 107-115.
(19.) Cursetjee Framjee Wadia is reputed to be the first Parsi to be buried in China, at Macao. See K.N. Seervai & B.B. Patell, Gujarat Parsis from Their Earliest Settlement to the Present Time, in Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency, vol. 9. part 2, edited by J.M. Campbell (Bombay: Government Central Press. 1899), p. 254.
(20.) See John R. Hinnells, The Zoroastrian Diaspora (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 165-173.
(21.) See Guha 1969, pp. 107-111.
(22.) See S.H. Jhabvala, Framji Cowasji Banaji: A Great Parsi (Bombay. 1920), p. 5, R.A. Wadia, Scions of Lowjee Wadia (Bombay: Ruttonjee Ardeshir Wadia, 1964), pp. 49-50: Guha 1969, pp. 104-111: Anne Bulley, The Bombay Country, Ships, 1790-1833 (Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon, 2000), pp. 162-163, 194-195.
(23.) Karaka, vol. 2, p. 57: Wacha 1920, p. 412.
(24.) C.J. Jehanghier. Life of Sir Cowasji Jehanghier (London: London Stereoscopic and Photographic Co.. 1890), p. 9; W.H. Coates, The Old Country Trade of the East Indies (London: Imray, 1911), p. 51.
(25.) K.N. Vaid. The Overseas Indian Community in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1972), p. 53.
(26.) Karaka, vol. 2, pp. 49-55.
(27.) Karaka, vol. 2, pp. 54-55.
(28.) Karaka, vol. 2. pp. 115-117.
(29.) Karaka, vol. 2. p. 123.
(30.) Karaka, vol. 2, pp. 60-76.
(31.) Karaka, vol. 2. p. 44: see also, Amar Farooqui, Smuggling as Subversion: Colonialism, Indian Merchants and the Politics of Opium. 1790-1843 (Landham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005). pp. 16-29.
(32.) Karaka, vol. 2, pp. 59-60.
(33.) See F.R. Harris, Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata: A Chronicle of His Life. 2nd ed. (Bombay: Blackie & Son Ltd.), pp. 5-6.
(34.) Karaka, vol. 2, pp. 76-78.
(35.) R.B. Madon, Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy: First Parsi Baronet (Bombay. 1899), p. 30.
(36.) Reference to de Faria by Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy (hereafter cited as J.J.) to William Jardine, August 6, 1831 in Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Manuscripts, vol. 349, p. 52, University of Bombay Library (hereafter cited as J.J. MSS): Williamson Ramsay, Memorandum on the Life and Public Charities of Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy (London. published anonymously, 1855), p. 18: J.R.P. Mody, Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy: The First Indian Knight and Baronet. 1783-1859 (Bombay: Evergreen. 1959), pp. 33-34.
(37.) Bombay Times, April 16, 1859; J.J. to William Jardine, August 6, 1831, J.J. MSS, vol. 349, p. 80; J.J. to John Romer, March 14, 1849, J.J. MSS, vol. 359, p. 44: J.J. Sons & Co. to Daniel & Co. and to Jardine Matheson & Co., on behalf of friends, December 24-25, 1838, J.J. MSS, vol. 375, pp. 131-33; J.J. to de Vitre, April 23, 1842, J.J. MSS, vol. 369, pp. 120-121: Asiya Siddiqi, The Business World of Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, The Indian Economic and Social History. Review, 19. no. 3 & 4 (1982), pp. 301-323.
(38.) Karaka. vol. 2, pp. 44--46, 54-55, 59; Ramsay, p. 8; C.S. Nazir. The First Parsee Baronet (Bombay: Union Press, 1866), pp. 19-24; Wacba 1920, p. 627; Mody, pp. 32-33.
(39.) See Alain Le Pichon, China Trade and Empire: Jardine, Matheson & Co. and the Origins of British Rule in Hong Kong, 1827-1843 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 28.
(40.) Brook & Wakabayashi (eds.); Blair B. Kling & M.N. Pearson (eds.), The Age of Partnership: Asia Before Domination (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1979); Amalendu Guha, More About Parsi Sheths: Their Roots, Entrepreneurship and Comprador Role, 1650-1918, in Business Communities of India: An Historical Perspective, edited by Dwijendra Tripatbi (New Delhi: Manohar. 1984), pp. 44-45: Ashin Das Gupta, Indian Merchants in the Age of Partnership, 1500-1800, in Business Comnunities of India: An Historical Perspective, edited by Dwijendra Tripathi (New Delhi: Manohar, 1984).
(41.) Siddiqi 1982. pp. 301-324: J.J. MSS, vol. 375. pp. 21, 133: J.J. " MSS. vol. 349. p. 37; Karaka, vol. 2, pp. 79-84.
(42.) J.J. to Daniell & Co., December 24, 1838, J.J. MSS, vol. 375, pp. 131-32.
(43.) See Jesse S. Palsetia, Merchant Charity and Public Identity Formation in Colonial India: The Case of Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. 40, issue 3 (2005), 197-217.
(44.) Compare Emadad-ul Haq. Drugs in South Asia: From the Opium Trade to the Present Day (New York: Palgrave 2000) and John F. Richards, 'Cannot We Induce the People of England to Eat Opium?' The Moral Economy of Opium in Colonial India in Drugs and Empires: Essays in Modem Imperialism and Intoxication, c. 1500-c. 1930, edited by James H. Mills & Patricia Barton (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 73-80.
(45.) Farooqui 2005, pp. 222-223.
(46.) J.J. to Capt. George Elliot, March 26, 1842, J.J. MSS, vol. 369, pp. 94-96: J.J. to James Matheson, April 11, 1842, J.J. MSS, vol. 369. p. 115.
(47.) Wadia 1964. pp. 146-153.
(48.) See Karaka, vol. 1, pp. 79-88.
(49.) Siddiqi 1982, pp. 301-323: Siddiqi 2005, p. 29, Farooqui 2005, pp. 223-226.
(50.) J.J. Sons & Co. to Daniell & Co.. December 17, 1838, J.J. MSS, vol. 375. pp. 131-132.
(51.) See H.B. Morse, Chronicles of the East India Company Trading in China. 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), vol. 2, pp. 44. 110-111,149, 180-181: Menant, p. 220.
(52.) See George Viscount Valentia, Voyages and Travels to India, Ceylon, the Red Sea. Abyssinia, and Egypt: In the Years 1802, 1803, 1804, 1805. and 1806, 4 vols. (London: William Miller, 1809). vol. 2, p. 187.
(53.) John R. Hinnells, Parsis and the British Journal of the K.R. Cama Oriental Institute, vol. 46 (1978), p. 13.
(54.) Menant, p. 347.
(55.) Parsee Prakash: Being a Record of Important Events in the Growth of the Parsee Community in Western India. Chronologically Arranged, vol. 1 (in Gujarati), edited by B.B. Patell (Bombay: Dufter Ashkara Pres, 1888), p. 269.
(56.) J.J. to Sir James Carnac. March 28, 1842, J.J. MSS, vol. 369, pp. 96-99.
(57.) See J.J. to Capt. Charles Elliot, the British Superintendent of Trade at Canton. March 26, 1842. J.J. MSS, vol. 369, pp. 94-96: J.J. to J.A. Smith, March 30, 1842. J.J. MSS, vol. 369, pp. 101-102: J.J. to Sir Charles Forbes, May 21, 1842, J.J. MSS, vol. 369, p. 172: J.J. to Capt. Elliot. May 23, 1842. J.J. MSS, vol. 369, pp. 180-181; Mody, p. 34; Parsee Prakash, vol. 1, p. 366; H.D. Darukhanawala, Parsi Lustre on Indian Soil (Bombay: G. Claridge, 1939), pp. 508-509.
(58.) Vaid, p. 10. On the terms of the Treaty of Nanjing see Colin N. Crisswell, The Taipans: Hong Kong's Merchant Princes (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1981). ch. 2.
(59.) J.J. to Capt. Charles Elliott. March 26, 1842. J.J. MSS, vol. 369, pp. 94-95.
(60.) Bombay Times. March 20, 1858.
(61.) Bombay Times. March 20, 1858.
(62.) See Jesse S. Palsetia, Honourable Machinations: The Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Baronetcy and the Indian Response to the Honours System in India" South Asia Research. vol. 23, no. 1 (May 2003), pp. 55-76.
(63.) See Dobbin, pp. 21-25: J.M. Masselos, Towards Nationalism: Group Affiliations and the Politics of Associations in Western India (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1974); Amar Farooqui, Opium City: The Making of Early Victorian Bombay (Gurgaon: Three Essays Collective, 2006).
(64.) S.P. Davar, The History of the Parsi Punchayet of Bombay (Bombay: New Book Company Limited), p. 39: Dobbin, pp. 24-25.
(65.) Dobbin, pp. 24-25.
(66.) Douglas E. Haynes. From Tribute to Philanthropy: The Politics of Gift Giving in a Western Indian City, Journal of Asian Studies. vol. 46, no. 2 (1987), pp. 339-360.
(67.) Seervai & Patell, pp. 249-254: John R. Hinnells, The Flowering of Zoroastrian Benevolence, in Papers in Honour of Professor Mary, Boyce. Hommages et Opera Minora, edited by H. Bailey, A. D. H. Bivar, J. Duchesne-Guillemin & J. Hinnells (Leiden: Brill, 1985). pp. 317-322.
(68.) The Times of India, October 23, 1863; Dinsha E. Wacha, Premchund Roychund: His Early Life and Career (Bombay: Published by D.E. Wacha and Printed at the Times Press, 1913), pp. 144-145; David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 105-111.
(69.) Douglas E. Haynes, Rhetoric and Ritual in a Colonial City: The Shaping of Public Culture in Surat City. 1852-1928 (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 121-126.
(70.) Bombay Times, March 11, 1840.
(71.) Ramsay, pp. 30-32: Bombay Times, April 16, 1859.
(72.) Sohrab K.H. Katrak, Who Are the Parsees? (Karachi: Pakistan Herald Press, 1965), pp. 288-293.
(73.) See Philip Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 5.
(74.) Crisswell, p. 85.
(75.) Crisswell, chs 6, 9.
(76.) Crisswell, p. 197.
(77.) Crisswell, pp. 198-199.
(78.) Harris, pp. 5-16.
(79.) Crisswell, pp. 184-185.
(80.) R.J.F. Sullivan, One Hundred Years of Bombay. 1836-1936 (Bombay: Times of India Press, 1937). p. 10. Dinsha E. Wacha. A Financial Chapter in the History of Bombay City (Bombay: Commercial Press, 1910); Wacha 1920, pp. 530-532; Wadia 1964. pp. 112-113: A.K. Bagchi, European and Indian Entrepreneurs in India, 1900-30, in Elites in South Asia, edited by Edmund Leach & S.N. Mukherjee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1970), pp. 230-231; Desai, p. 312.
(81.) S.M. Rutnagur, Bombay Industries: The Cotton Mills (Bombay: Indian Textile Journal. 1927), pp. 9-10; S.D. Mehta, The Cotton Mills of India. 1854 to 1954 (Bombay: Textile Association of India. 1954), pp. 13-15: Morris D. Morris. Large-Scale Industry, in The Cambridge Economic History of India. vol. 2: c. 1700-1970, edited by Dharma Kumar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 574-575; Karaka. vol. 2, pp. 247-248: Desai. p. 312.
(82.) Mehta. pp. 21-22: Morris. p. 581: Karaka. vol. 2, p. 248.
(83.) Karaka. vol. 2, pp. 136-137.
(84.) Wadia 1964, pp. 244-245.
(85.) Dinsha E. Wacha, Life and Work of J. N. Tata (Madras: Ganesh. 1915), p. 24: G.A. Natesan and Co. (ed.), Famous Parsis (Madras: Natesan, 1930), p. 222: Anon., A Short History, of the "'Empress Mills." Nagpur. Started Work 1st January, 1877. Golden Jubilee Volume (Bombay, 1927); Mehta, p. 58.
(86.) Siddiqi 1982, p. 323; Karaka, vol. 2, pp. 257-259.
(87.) R.A. Wadia, A Forgotten Friend of India: Charles Forbes 1st Bart (Baroda: Padmaja Publications, 1946), p. 51.
(88.) Crisswell, p. 141.
(89.) See R.K. Newman. India and the Anglo-Chinese Opium Agreements, 1907-1914, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 23, no. 3 (1989), pp. 525-560.
